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Abstract 
The Marco Legal Estable provides us with a rare opportunity to study a system of multi-output reim­
bursements applied to the distribution of electricity in Spain over an extensive period of time: 1988 – 
1997. To do so, an analysis structure is proposed based on a Bennet-type indicator (1920), which al­
lows us to identify the variations in the revenues associated with the activity of electricity distribution, 
for each of the companies and each one of the outputs. The Law recognized, regulated and compensat­
ed four products differently. This indicator is broken down into a quantity effect and a reimbursement 
effect. The quantity effect evaluates the impact on revenues of the variations in demand for each of the 
outputs, and the reimbursement effect the modifications in revenues due to the changes in the remu­
neration per product, which are based on standard costs. Modern production theory is used to explain 
the quantity indicator by means of a productivity and activity effect. Lastly, the productivity indicator 
is broken down into operating efficiency, allocative efficiency and technical change. To do so, a se­
quential-type technology is defined whose information begins in 1952. Mathematical programming 
techniques are used to resolve the proposed economic decomposition. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early nineteen eighties, there has been a major wave of reforms that have affect­
ed many traditionally regulated sectors all over the world. The electricity industry has been no 
exception. In Spain, in a simultaneous way to the more closely studied case of Great Britain, 
a period of major transformation in the electricity sector was initiated, one that was embarked 
upon as a consequence of the severe financial difficulties that the industry was experiencing. 
This process of change culminated in 1987 with the approval of the system of regulation 
known as the Marco Legal Estable (henceforth MLE), which remained in force until 1997, and 
was a fundamental change of approach compared to previous regulating frameworks1. 
At present, the sector is fully involved in implementing the Electricity Sector Law 
(ESL), in force since 1998, and which has meant the liberalization of the sector. This imple­
mentation is being accompanied by an intense debate regarding the functioning of the model 
being established and the achievement of the goals set out in the Law. Numerous studies 
have been carried out in this respect since the law came into force; for example Arozena, 
Kühn, and Regibeau (1999), Fabra (2006), Fabra and Toro (2005), Vives (2006), and of spe­
cial relevance, Pérez Arriaga (2005). 
The activity of distribution, together with transportation, continues to be considered by 
the current legal framework to be regulated. Some innovative aspects introduced by the new 
regulation of distribution activity have been studied by Grifell Tatjé and Lovell (2003). 
However, the legal application of their regulations did not come into force until 2000, with 
the reform of the rules regarding their reimbursement still pending2. We can therefore con­
sider this activity to still be in a confusing transitional stage, with many aspects of the MLE 
remaining in force3. Only more recently seems to have been a clear desire to provide a solu­
tion to the economic aspects of this activity in the framework of the New Electricity Sector 
Law4. In this context, it seems relevant to study the only clearly defined system of regula­
tion that distribution in Spain has had up until now, i.e. the MLE system. This should be done 
by analyzing the consequences of its application, with an eye to the possible reproduction of 
its virtues in a new regulatory framework and with the aim of overcoming the defects or dif­
ficulties associated with it. 
The MLE regulated all electricity activities, with one of its fundamental elements being 
the concept of standard cost, i.e. the setting by the Administration of objective costs for the 
system that would eliminate surplus expenses, and on which the companies’ reimbursement 
would be based. Authors such as Laffont and Tirole (1993: 86) have regarded it as a rare ex­
ample of a “yardstick competition” system. Others, such as Rodríguez and Castro (1994), 
maintain that it is more a case of a system of regulation based on maximum prices. As we 
shall see, the regulation of electricity distribution was based on a complex multi-output sys­
tem open to a number of different interpretations. 
The MLE has been the object of attention in literature, although most studies have dealt 
with issues related to adverse selection. For example they attempt to decide whether the way 
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in which the law was designed, and especially the way that certain costs were set, was ade­
quate or not. In this sense, most authors sustain that in setting these costs there was a lack of 
objectivity and thoroughness. The studies by Fernández (1994), Martínez (1991), Rojas 
(1995), Ariño and López de Castro (1998), among others, are along these lines. In contrast, 
this study will focus on aspects related to the moral hazard. Specifically, it will analyze how 
the parties involved behaved once the MLE was in force, and will attempt to provide empir­
ical evidence of how the system has worked. From this standpoint and for the period that the 
MLE has been in force, Arozena and Waddams-Price (2002) have studied the efficiency and 
productivity of a set of coal-fired electricity generating plants in a theoretical context defined 
by the Malmquist indexes (1953) [Färe et al. (1994)]. For the same time period, Ramos and 
Martínez (2004) have studied technical change by applying a methodology based on costs, 
but defining the vertically integrated electricity company as a unit of analysis, and consider­
ing both the generation and distribution of electricity. This article complements those that 
have preceded it, since for the first time it studies the activity of electricity distribution for 
this period in isolation, as this is the only activity, together with transmission, that is still cur­
rently considered as being an object of regulation. 
In the literature dealing with the MLE, there is consensus in considering that the func­
tion of a distributing company’s profits is defined by the difference between the standard 
costs recognized and the costs incurred by the company. This being the case, the MLE left 
open certain regulatory aspects that were the object of continual renegotiation and various 
revisions throughout the period in which it was in force. In this sense, it is worth stressing 
that in Spain the activity’s regulator is the government itself, and that there is a tradition in 
the sector that the latter should reach a consensus with the companies regarding regulation. 
With regard to this state of affairs, Rodríguez and Castro (1994: 181) pointed out that the 
companies’ behavior might be directed, not towards decreasing their total incurred costs, 
which would be socially desirable, but to increasing their revenues. In other words, their in­
terest lies in increasing the recognized standard costs. This possible behavior was also high­
lighted by Laffont and Crampes (1995: 140). In addition, we should bear in mind that the 
majority of an electricity distribution company’s inputs are quasi-fixed. Thus, any strategic 
behavior by the company aimed at obtaining greater profits should mainly take the form of 
a search for greater revenues. 
The main aim of this study is to examine the companies’ behavior by analyzing how the 
revenues obtained from the regulator for the distribution activity have evolved5. In this 
sense, it should be pointed out that the information that can be obtained from a focus based 
on revenues is similar to the one for costs. However, in the former instance, the assessment 
is made by means of the incentive system provided by the regulator, while in the latter the 
prices of the inputs are used. This study based on the revenue side has been possible due to 
the researcher’s access to the MLE reimbursement system, which details every aspect of the 
activity for each distribution company and for the whole period that the MLE was in force. 
Information is available for each of the products, understood as the energy delivered at the 
different voltage levels as well as all retailing activity. These products were regulated in a 
differentiated way by the MLE. 
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The existence of a differentiated regulation for each of the products encouraged a “par­
tial” strategic behavior by the company. That is it could exploit the weaknesses of the sys­
tem, identifying and applying pressure to its weaker points, which could only affect aspects 
related to one or several products. Everything seems to indicate that this strategic behavior, 
aimed at obtaining higher revenues, took place in the Spanish power distribution companies, 
leading to a significant increase in the quality of the service. This was especially the case 
over the period from 1988 to 1993. There was no economic incentive for the improvement 
of this concept during this period, thus constituting a rare case of positive externality. 
In order to perform this analysis, we propose the use of a new methodology based on a 
Bennet-type revenue indicator (1920) [Diewert (2005)], which allows the required informa­
tion to be differentiated according to product. In addition, our aim is to decompose this in­
dicator in accordance with the economic theory of production, allowing us to quantify the 
variations of productivity in terms of revenues. We will also examine a series of issues that 
are central from the regulatory point of view. This decomposition was carried out using 
mathematical programming techniques based on ‘Data Envelopment Analysis’ (DEA) mod­
els (Charnes et al, 1978). The use of DEA in the analysis of electricity distribution regula­
tion is very common in the literature. For example, Bogetoft (1997), Kurhonen and Syrjänen 
(2003) Agrell et al, (2005) have applied it to the analysis of this activity6. 
It should also be noted that, in analyzing how company revenues evolve we are opening 
up a new field of study, since studies existing up until now of electricity distribution have 
focused mainly on three areas: i) Analysis of scale economies and the efficiency of distribu­
tion companies. Studies in this line of research include those by Giles and Wyatt (1993), Sal­
vanes and Tjotta (1994), Burns and Weyman Jones (1996) and Yatchew (2000); ii) The dif­
ferences between the public and private electricity distribution companies (Hjalmarsson and 
Veiderpass (1992a,b), Pollit (1995), Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998); and iii) The analy­
sis of proposals for regulating the activity (Weyman Jones (1992), Norwegian Water Re­
sources and Energy (1997), OFGEM (2000)). 
The article is structured in the following way: Section 2 provides a description of the 
most significant aspects of the reward system set out in the MLE; Section 3 presents the the­
oretical model; Section 4 explains the key aspects of its implementation; Section 5 is a dis­
cussion of the data employed and the definition of the variables; Section 6 sets out the main 
results obtained; and lastly, the section containing the conclusions closes the article. 
2. The Marco Legal Estable 
The enactment of Royal Decree 1538/1987 of December 11th would define a new regu­
latory framework for the electricity sector in Spain known as the Marco Legal Estable, and 
this was to remain in force formally until 19977. The MLE is, without a doubt, a complex 
regulating system developed in several phases, by means of various Royal Decrees and Min­
isterial Orders. This legislative complexity is more marked in the case of electricity distribu­
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tion since, unlike generation, it defines and regulates four products differently. In theory, the 
legislative changes introduced to the MLE over time should be understood as an attempt to 
remedy the defects detected in the regulation system. As can be seen in Table 1, which pro-
vides a summary of these legislative changes for the case of electricity distribution in which 
we are interested, it was from 1993 onwards that important changes were introduced. By this 
time enough empirical evidence of its functioning had been accumulated. 
Table 1 
SUMMARY OF THE MLE FOR THE ACTIVITY OF ELECTRICITY DISSTRIBUTION 
Legal Framework Product affected Regulation introduced 
Royal Decree of All Setting of the terms according to which the electricity 
December 11th 1987 distribution costs are to be standardized 
Order of February All Establishing the compensation costs between systems and 
19th 1988 designing the inter-companies compensations system. 
Order of December High voltage Expanding the factors on which the rate of return on high 
19th 1988 voltage investments depends. 
Order of December All Establishing the parameters for correcting the deviations in 
22nd 1988 determining the tariff. 
Order of December High voltage Setting the standard distribution costs for high voltage, and 
22nd 1988 the procedure for updating them. 
Orders of December High voltage, • Change in the index for updating the standard values in 
3rd and 17th 1993 medium voltage, high voltage. 
low voltage, • Change in the criteria applied to the rate of return on high 
retailing, voltage investments. 
structural costs. • Considered as standard structural costs differentiated for 
the activities of distribution and generation. 
• Replacing the coefficient for correcting the fixed standard 
costs for facilities <36kv by a supplement to investments. 
• Setting new commercial unit costs and the adjustment 
index at 0.75. 
• Introduction of a timid economic incentive for quality 
of service. 
Resolution of January High voltage Change in the criteria applied to the rate of return on high 
20th 1994 voltage investments. 
Order of December High voltage, • Changes in the criteria applied to the rate of return on 
15th 1995 medium voltage, high voltage investments. 
low voltage, • Review of commercial costs. 
commercial • Review of structural costs. 
management • Change in the updating rate of operating costs for all 
voltages. 
Order of May Retailing • Establishing programs to encourage demand that will be 
29th 1997 added to the commercial costs. 
The MLE had two fundamental goals: To create a system that allows the economic and 
financial balance of the Spanish electricity sector to be re-established, and to ensure that this 
system is compatible with the introduction of efficiency incentives. To attain these goals, the 
MLE’s regulation system was structured into two levels: i) the determination of the electric­
ity tariff according to the standard costs per product; and ii) a distribution mechanism of the 
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tariff funds among companies based on the average revenues and the average standard costs 
of the sector. We shall describe this regulation in detail below. 
2.1. Standard Costs in Electricity Distribution 
According to the MLE, the fundamental premise for calculating the tariff is that it cov­
ers the exact cost of the service. In this way, the tariff embodies the total cost of the system, 
obtained by adding together all the costs established for all the elements and all the compa­
nies of which it is comprised. These costs are calculated in a standard way, i.e. in a way that 
is common for all the companies. In addition, it is governed by the principle of a uniform 
tariff throughout the national territory, without price differences resulting from the compa­
nies’ different cost structure. This calculation is made in average terms by taking the simple 
quotient between the standard costs of the system –plus surcharges and external costs– and 
the estimated kw/h demanded every year8. 
In this way an incentive regulation system is introduced: it establishes that companies 
are not to be compensated for the costs that they really incur, but for costs evaluated accord­
ing to a standard that objectifies the necessary expenses and avoids the reimbursement of su­
perfluous costs. These standard quantities will be the revenues received by the companies in 
the sector, regardless of their real costs. 
To compensate the activity of electricity distribution, the MLE establishes a differenti­
ated regulation for each of the products supplied: i) electricity supplied at high voltage; ii) 
electricity supplied at medium voltage; iii) electricity supplied at low voltage; and iv) com­
mercial retailing. To these costs are added what are referred to as structural costs. As to the 
actual supply of electricity a threshold is established which is relative to the voltage level, 
applying different criteria for those costs incurred in voltages higher than 36 kV to those of 
the costs incurred in lower voltages. In addition, a differentiated regulation is applied for 
fixed costs and operating costs in each of the voltages considered. 
High Voltage Regulation 
The standard costs of high voltage distribution facilities (between 36 kV and 132 kV) 
are compensated in accordance with physical units (kilometers of power line, number of 
cells, transformation power), regardless of the effective use of these. In this way, stan­
dard costs are recognized according to the type of facility. The recognition of these costs 
should allow, on the one hand, the recuperation of the gross value of investment via 
amortization, and on the other, the correct remuneration of the capital. The financial cost 
is determined by applying a rate of return on the standard net value of the facilities9. It is 
important to stress that the guidelines to be followed to calculate this rate of return were 
constantly being changed throughout the time the MLE was in force, being revised in 
1993, 1994 and 1995. 
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In order to recognize new high voltage investments (and exceptionally medium and low 
voltage), the MLE required an investment plan to be presented to and approved by the Re­
gional Government10. It should be stressed in this sense that, although the mandate for the 
approval of facilities had been transferred to the regional governments, it was not these or­
ganisms but rather the Ministry of Industry and Energy that was charged with paying the 
companies. In this way a disfunctionality was introduced to the state’s decentralization 
process. This was because the organism approving the new investments, and as a conse­
quence recognizing the new costs, was not the one that subsequently paid for them. 
For their part, the high voltage operating costs embraced the set of costs deriving from 
operating and maintaining the facilities. These costs were also standardized based on unit 
costs per physical units: circuit length per lines, and number of connections per substations11. 
Up until 1995, the updating of these costs was performed by applying the RPI, and from 
1995 onwards, by applying an updating rate of RPI minus two points. 
Regulating Medium and Low Voltage 
In terms of the costs corresponding to medium and low voltage facilities (less than 
36kv), these are remunerated basically according to the energy circulated by these facilities 
and not based on physical units as in the case of high voltage12. Two types of standard costs 
are recognized: fixed costs and operating costs. 
In order to establish the fixed annual standard cost, a number of standard unit values per 
kW/h circulated are determined, differentiating between medium and low voltage13. These 
values are updated on a yearly basis. This is done though a price index calculated by consid­
ering, in equal proportion, the retail price index and the industrial product price index14. It is 
curious to note that the way in which the MLE regulates the fixed costs of medium and low 
voltage has been completely overlooked in the literature. The standard unit values are adjust­
ed by an important discounting factor (X) of 25% of the aforementioned price index15. In 
consequence, we can see how the 1987 legislation already introduced (although only partial­
ly, since it did not affect operating costs nor all the products) the Littlechild recommenda­
tions (1983) to adjust unit prices by a discount rate. Notice that this discount rate of 25% is 
fixed and independent of the efficiency levels in electricity distribution. This aspect contra­
dicts the widespread belief that the costs in the MLE were only adjusted upwards, as infla­
tion levels alone were considered. 
In addition, the adjusted fixed costs could be affected by a correcting coefficient derived 
from: the geographical dispersion of the market, whether the power line network was under­
ground and other special characteristics of the areas supplied. This correction coefficient 
could not be higher than 10% of the fixed costs. In 1993, the coefficient was replaced by a 
supplement aimed at encouraging investment in distribution lower than 36kv. In this case the 
supplement could not be higher than 14% of the fixed costs. Its calculation would take into 
account not only the aforementioned special characteristics of the market, but also invest­
122 LETICIA BLÁZQUEZ GÓMEZ Y EMILI GRIFELL-TATJÉ 
ments aimed at improving the quality of the service. For the first time, and having been in 
force for six years, the MLE referred specifically to quality and introduced a slight incentive 
aimed at its improvement. This incentive would remain in force until 1997, only to be later 
abolished by the current Electricity Sector Law in 1999. This gives us an idea of the little 
importance that the regulator gave to quality in designing the reimbursement system for the 
sector. 
In the case of the operating costs of voltages below 36kv, standard costs were also es­
tablished according to the energy circulated. This was done with the difference between low 
and medium voltage facilities being made according to the same criteria as for fixed costs. 
These unit costs were updated annually in line with the RPI until 1995, without applying any 
kind of discount. From this year on, the RPI minus three percentage points was applied to 
them. 
Regulation of Commercial Management and Structure Costs 
Another concept to be taken into account are the retailing commercial costs, which in­
clude activities related to managing and developing the customer market. In doing so a dif­
ferentiated regulation is also being applied to these costs. The standardization of these costs 
is performed according to the number of contract policies and the power subscribed in volt­
ages greater than 1kv16. The adjustment coefficients between both elements are established 
every year by an Energy Department Resolution. In the same way, the costs are updated an­
nually according to the corresponding RPI. In 1993, the unit costs for commercial manage­
ment were modified, and the only discretionary remuneration element was eliminated when 
the adjustment index was set at 0.75. These costs were revised once again in 1995, and in 
1997 an incentive for demand management was added to commercial costs. 
Lastly, structure costs have to be considered. Up until 1993 these costs were considered 
to be one more concept of the costs included in the tariff, without distinguishing which part 
corresponded to generation and which to distribution. From this year on, these costs were 
differentiated according to how they corresponded to each of these activities, with their pa­
rameters, method of calculation, and updating being defined in a differentiated manner. In 
this way, for distribution a standard unit cost per kw/h supplied to the end user was estab­
lished, to be updated annually in line with the corresponding RPI. In 1995, a mere two years 
after being set, the structure unit costs were modified. 
2.2. The Inter-Companies Compensation System 
The final stage of the MLE corresponds to that known as the inter-companies compen­
sation system17. As we have seen, each electricity company was recognized as having stan­
dard costs in accordance with the activity of distribution arising from the sum of the stan­
dard costs associated with each of the products discussed in the previous sub-section. To 
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these costs were added those corresponding to generation, which is not an object of study in 
this paper. In order for the aforementioned regulation system to work, the standard costs that 
the company were recognized as having had to constitute their only revenues. Nonetheless, 
the company supplied the electricity to the end consumer and obtained payment by means of 
the rate charged for this service. The aim of the compensation system was to ensure that the 
final payment received by the company, essentially its revenues, would be exactly equal to 
the amount of the standard costs recognized by the regulator. To do so, each company’s tar­
iff receipts were adjusted, with this adjustment being defined as the compensation system. 
With CSh being the standard costs recognized for company h by applying the reimburse­
ment system described in the previous sub-section, where CSh = Σ4 m=1CSmh, with m = 1,…,4 
expressing the number of outputs. If we assume that there are n distributors, the total stan­
dard costs recognized in the system would be defined by: Σn i=1CSi. In addition, if Rh express­
es the amount charged by h to its customers, we see that Σn i=1Ri expresses the total receipts 
associated with the distribution activity. One of the conditions that needs to be met is that 
the total receipts for the system (R) are the same as the total standard costs recognized (CS), 
i.e.: R = CS. In other words, Σn = Σn i=1CSi. The compensation associated with companyi=1Ri 
h, which we express as zh, is simply equal to: 
zh = CSh – Rh (1) 
When z < 0, the company will pass on the previous quantity, received from its takings, 
to the remaining companies. When z > 0, the company will receive this quantity from the 
other companies. Naturally, when z = 0 the amount received is exactly the same as the stan­
dard costs recognized, and it will neither return nor receive any funds. Notice that: Σn = i=1zi 
0. In this way, the profits of a company h are defined by: 
πh = CSh - ΣN j=1ωjhxjh, (2) 
where (x1,...,xN) expresses the vector of the inputs used in distribution, and (ω1,..., ωN) the 
vector of their respective prices. Thus, the sum of the previous expression represents the 
company’s total operating costs. Expression (2) tells us that the profits come from the dif­
ference between the standard costs and the total operating costs incurred in providing the 
service. 
The equality R = CS enables us to rewrite expression (1) as: 
(3) CS R CS py ry R z zh h h h h h h h− = −[ ]+ −[ ] = +1 2 ,
where yh defines the quantity of energy delivered by the company h to the consumer and 
Σn i=1yi = y the total quantity of energy supplied by the system, i.e. by all the companies taken 
as a whole. Expression (3) explains the difference between the standard costs and company 
h’s receipts. The first addend, z1, shows that the standard costs recognized are different from
h
those coming from the product between the sector’s average standard costs (average reim­
124 LETICIA BLÁZQUEZ GÓMEZ Y EMILI GRIFELL-TATJÉ 
bursement) (p – = CS/y) and the energy supplied by h. The second, reveals that the receipts 
obtained do not coincide with that which would be obtained by applying the average tariff 
for the sector (r– = R/y). This is a common situation, since the company takings depend on 
its demand structure, which may easily fail to coincide with the sector’s average structure. 
Lastly, we would like to draw attention to the fact that the MLE introduced a correction to 
2this last expression. The company would only give or receive half of z , i.e.: 1/2(z2). This
h h
means that distributor h’s revenue function would be rewritten as: 
Income CS R ryh h h h= + −[ ]
1
2
,
and, in consequence, the function of profits (2) as: 
 1  nπh = CSh + (Rh − ryh ) − ∑ j=1ω jh x jh , (4) 2 
where the total revenue for h is provided by the standard costs, to which additional revenues 
are added that are equal to half of the difference between the amount received and that cal­
culated using the average tariff for the sector. The profits are equal to the difference between 
these revenues and the total costs incurred. 
2.3. How can we classify the MLE? 
It could be deduced from the aforementioned description of the MLE that it obeys the 
philosophy of price cap regulation, since the standard costs are the prices that the companies 
will initially charge for each of their outputs. In addition, as we have demonstrated, in the 
case of medium and low voltage, a part of the remuneration was adjusted by an annual dis­
count factor of 25% of the average RPI and the industrial product price index. However, 
Crampes and Laffont (1995) and Laffont and Tirole (1993) consider the MLE to be a yard­
stick competition model (Shleifer, 1985). In a yardstick competition system the company’s 
reimbursement, or its recognized costs, are calculated using the average costs of the sector. 
In this context the compensation associated with a company h is defined by: 
 n N x ∑ i=1 ∑ j=1ω i j, i j,z′ =  y − R , (5)h h h y   
where the first term on the right-hand side of the equation defines the costs that the regula­
tor recognizes for the company. In a simplified way, this can be expressed by CRh. The in­
terpretation of expression (5) is exactly the same as that already mentioned in the case of ex­
pression (1). The profits for company h are now given by: 
πh = CRh − ∑ N j=1ω jhx jh , (6) 
where we can see the similarity with expression (2). In certain contexts, the yardstick system 
also regulates the company takings, in such a way that this is calculated using the information 
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regarding the average revenues for the sector, in an analogous way to that already described 
for the costs. In (5), these estimated revenues replace those really obtained by the company 
(Rh). By introducing this modification, the profit function that Crampes and Laffont obtain 
(1995: 130) is equal to (4), but replacing CSh by CRh, and without the 1/2 value. Here we see a 
repetition of the similarity already observed between expressions (2) and (6). These similari­
ties are what prompted previous authors to classify the MLE as a yardstick regulation system. 
However, Crampes and Laffont (1995: 130), point out that: “although CRh is non manipulable 
by h (at least if there are a considerable number of firms in the sector), such is not the case for 
CSh. The system should therefore have an extremely strict government managerial staff who 
avoid letting standard costs drift to a firm’s advantage…, In essence, [while]Yardstick Com­
petition is anonymous, this is no longer the case for its Spanish adaptation, which brings up 
the question of standard cost review and new investment evaluation” (our notation). 
On this point, we should remember that distribution companies could increase their rec­
ognized standard costs by investing and putting new high-voltage facilities into service, re­
gardless of their use. It would be difficult to refuse requests for new facilities since, as we 
have already commented, it was the regional government that approved facilities whereas it 
was the Ministry of Industry and Energy who were charged with reimbursing them. In con­
sequence, we see how one of the fears voiced by Crampes and Laffont materializes, although 
only “partially”, since it only affects one of the products regulated. Additionally, it should 
be said that the literature has been especially critical of the process employed in determin­
ing the standard costs. For example, Ariño and López de Castro (1998) point out that these 
were set using the criterion of real historical costs, whose basic element of information are 
the ledger values of assets. Hence, the standard basic value simply reflected the average of 
the historically incurred costs, a value that could hardly be seen as coinciding with the ideal, 
objective, inefficiency-free value that the standard aimed to constitute18. The hypothesis that 
the standard costs associated with high-voltage facilities were overvalued is quite plausible, 
which would provide an additional incentive for putting new facilities into service. 
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the function of revenues defined in (4) has earned lit­
tle attention in the literature. This tells us that the company will receive half of the difference 
between its receipts and that calculated for the average receipts for the sector. The introduction 
of this modification might encourage a behavior of adverse company selection in relation to 
the customer, since the distributor will seek to contract high voltage connections, with a high­
er tariff, even though the customer might not need it, in order to make the difference greater. 
In an internal report in 1996, FECSA company supported these arguments. 
3. The Theory Model 
3.1. The Bennet Indicator 
Expression (2) reveals that the company can increase its profits by obtaining higher stan­
dard costs or by reducing operating costs19. The literature has paid special attention to the 
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impact that regulation has had on total company costs. But as far as we know, no articles that 
have turned their attention to how the company manages to generate its revenues. This lack 
of attention may be due to the fact that most of the studies assume, either implicitly or ex­
plicitly, that the process of regulation is closed, correctly designed, and that the company 
does not have the capacity of influencing it. Nonetheless, we have already seen that many 
aspects of the MLE have been the object of rectification over time. This fact, in itself, is in­
dicative that the previous initial hypotheses might not be true. In addition, it should be noted 
that any error in the regulatory design or any influence applied by the companies should be 
reflected in the way that these generate their revenues. These revenues are also influenced 
by variables that are exogenous to the company, such as the demand they are obliged to 
meet. Throughout this section we will present an economic model that will allow us to study 
the revenues obtained by the companies, i.e. their standard costs, in a multi-output situation. 
To do so we will combine two economic disciplines: index number theory and the modern 
neoclassical theory of production, in the methodological context initially proposed by Grifell 
Tatjé and Lovell (1999). 
Let us consider an electricity distributor h that produces M outputs represented by the 
quantity vector yh = (y1h,…,yMh) ≥ 0. This company receives a reimbursement from the reg­
ulator for its outputs expressed by the vector ph = (p1h,…,pMh) > 0. As we have seen in Sec­
tion 2, the regulator paid for each of the outputs in a differentiated way. For reasons of sim­
plicity we shall use the term “reimbursement” throughout the paper to refer to the unit 
monetary sums that are based on standard costs, in accordance with that set out in the previ­
ous section. We shall also abandon the ‘h’ notation, since all the methodology that follows 
is applied at company level. The revenues, i.e., the standard costs obtained by the company 
for the period t is given by the following expression: CSt = ptT.yt = ΣM .y t , where them=1 pmt m
superscript “T” expresses the transposition of a vector. 
Our aim is to identify the factors determining the changes in revenues between two con­
secutive periods of time: t y t+1. To do so, we began by breaking down the change in the 
revenues resulting from the movement from (yt, pt) to (yt+1, pt+1) into two basic components. 
The first of these, which we have called the reimbursement effect, reflects the impact on rev­
enues of the changes in the reimbursement for the electricity distribution activity. The fol­
lowing general diagram summarizes how the standard recognized costs and their unit reim­
bursement will be affected by the recognition of new facilities and the legislation revision 
processes set out in Table 1. 
Companies propose new HV 
Reimbursement facilities. The new HV facilities 
in accordance The regulator or the companies are approved/rejected. 
with regulation propose modifications in the The current legislation is Reimbursements 
in t current regulation modified/not modified paid in t+1 
t p , m = 1,…, M m
t+1p , m = 1,…, M m
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By quantifying the modifications in unit payments (result from the changes in the reward 
system being applied), the reimbursement effect reveals the tensions arising between the reg­
ulator and the companies between one period and another. In addition, it will reflect the in­
fluence of the latter exercised on the regulator, as well as the approval of new facilities. The 
second effect, which we have called the quantity effect, shows the impact on revenues of the 
changes in energy demand, with reimbursements being kept constant. 
A possible decomposition of the changes in revenues between a price effect and a quan­
tity effect is: 
CSt+1 – CSt = yt+1T (pt+1 – pt) + ptT (yt+1 – yt) (7) 
and another possible decomposition is: 
CSt+1 – CSt = ytT (pt+1 – pt) + pt+1T (yt+1 – yt) (8) 
In (7), the reimbursement effect appears similar in construction to a Paasche-type price 
index (setting the quantity at yt+1), and the quantity effect to a Laspeyres-type quantity index 
(setting the price of the outputs at pt), although expressed as differences rather than ratios. 
The opposite occurs in (8), where the reimbursement effect is similar to a Laspeyres index 
(setting the quantity of output at yt), and the quantity effect is similar to a Paasche index (set­
ting the prices of the outputs at pt+1). Expressions (7) and (8) can be used to construct a Ben­
net price indicator and Bennet quantity indicator that will be defined by the arithmetical 
mean of the two previous expressions. Hence: 
CSt+1 – CSt = 1/2 (yt+1 + yt)T (pt+1 – pt) Reimbursement Bennet 
(9) 
+ 1/2 (pt + pt+1)T (yt+1 – yt). Quantity Bennet 
We can see how the reimbursement effect reflects the modification in the payment sys­
tem adjusted by arithmetic mean quantity weights, whereas the quantity effect measures the 
changes in the quantities, adjusted by arithmetic mean reimbursement weights. Both the re­
imbursement effect and the quantity effect can be calculated directly from the observed data. 
It is interesting to observe that the structure of a Bennet indicator allows it to quantify the 
impact of the variations in prices and quantities on the changes in the standard costs paid to 
the companies, for each of the outputs. This characteristic will be especially useful in this 
study, since, as we have seen, products have been regulated in a differentiated way by the 
MLE. By using this indicator, we will then be able to evaluate the adjustments and modifi­
cations in the reimbursement mechanism in terms of revenues, over time, and for each of the 
electricity companies, as well as the variations in the quantities of electricity demanded. 
Bennet’s decomposition proposal, performed on profits, was rediscovered and studied 
by Diewert (2005), who has shown that it satisfies a set of desirable axioms of similar char­
acteristics to the case of the Fisher index number. We can see that a Bennet indicator has a 
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very similar structure to a Fisher number, although expressed in differences rather than ra­
tios. Diewert proposed using the term “indicator” for the expression in the form of differ­
ences, and “index” in the case of ratios. We have adhered to this terminology in this article. 
Grifell Tatjé and Lovell (2000) have shown how a Bennet quantity indicator of costs can 
be decomposed, and these same authors, in a previous article in 1999, demonstrated how a 
Laspeyres-type quantity indicator of profits could be decomposed (Expression 7). Grifell Tatjé 
and Lovell (2008) have recently applied a new methodology based on a Bennet profit indica­
tor. In the following section we shall extend these studies by proposing a new economic de­
composition of the Bennet quantity indicator of revenues (9) adjusted to the requirements of 
this study. Lastly, it should be stressed that expression (9) is not based on the assumption of 
any restrictive behavior by the evaluated company, such as the maximization of revenues. 
3.2. Decomposition of the Bennet Quality Indicator of Revenues 
St y St+1, in Figure 1, defines sets of feasible production activities in the time periods t and 
t+1. Pt(xt) and Pt+1(x t+1) in Figure 2 defines output sets corresponding to St and St+1. Figure 
1 expresses a general situation characterized by variable returns to scale. Hence we have St ⊂ 
St+1, since we assume that there has been technical progress. This hypothesis means that Pt(xt) 
⊂ Pt+1(xt), in Figure 2, which considers non-neutral technical change. In addition, we have 
Pt+1(xt) ⊂ Pt+1(x t+1), since we consider that xt < xt+1. In both Figure 1 and 2, in the period t, a 
company uses the input vector xt to distribute yt, and in the period t +1 a company uses the 
input vector xt+1 to distribute yt+1. In both figures, y t RE express vectors of outputs thatRE and y
t+1 
generate maximum revenues for (xt,pt,St) and (xt+1,pt+1,St+1) respectively, which are free of op­
erating and allocative inefficiency. In addition, technical progress enables a greater distribution 
of electricity. This is defined by yE, an output vector that generates optimum revenues for 
(xt,pt,St+1). Moreover, in Figure 2, yC and yD define two Debreu (1951) – Farell (1957) techni­
cally efficient output vectors for Pt(xt) and Pt+1(x t+1) respectively. The aim is to explain the 
Bennet quantity indicator, and to do so we propose the following decomposition: 
1/2 (pt + pt+1)T (yt+1 – yt) = 
1/2 (pt + pt+1)T (yRE 
t+1 – yE) Activity effect (10) 
+ 1/2 (pt + pt+1)T [(yt+1 – yRE Productivity effect
t+1) - (yt – yE)]. 
The output vectors yRE 
20 Both vec­t+1 and yE are the main components of the activity effect.
tors are defined with the technology of the period t +1, as shown in Figure 1. We observed that 
the changes in the production as a whole can only be explained by the variations in input quan­
tities. In consequence, we can say that the activity effect measures the expansion (contraction) 
of the electricity distributed –free of inefficiencies– resulting from a higher (lower) availabili­
ty of inputs. In the context of this study, these changes can mainly be associated with the en-
trance in operation of new electricity facilities. The difference between yRE 
t+1 and yE is assessed 
by the arithmetical mean of the output prices. The activity effect will contribute to an increase 
(decrease) in revenues for the period t to t+1 when 1/2(pt + pt+1)(yRE 
t+1 – yE) > (<) 0. 
For its part, the productivity effect compares the productions observed in each of the pe
riods with their respective optimum quantities calculated with the technology of the period t 
+1. The productivity effect will have a positive (negative) value when the loss of revenues 
obtained by operating in a non-optimum way in the period t+1, is less (more) than the loss 
of revenues resulting from the difference between the outputs observed for period t and the 
optimum outputs associated with (xt,pt,S t+1). The differences in outputs are aggregated using 
arithmetic mean output price weights. The productivity effect will contribute to an increase 
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Figure 1. Descomposition of the Bennet Quantity Indicator (I) 
Figure 2. Descomposition of the Bennet Quantity Indicator (II) 
-
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in revenues (or to a decrease) between period t and t+1 providing that [1/2(pt + pt+1)T(yt+1 – 
t+1)] > (<) [1/2(pt + pt+1)T[(yt – yE)]. In turn, the productivity effect can be decomposed intoyRE 
three more explanatory elements: an effect produced by the operating efficiency, a compo­
nent that measures the allocative efficiency and the contribution of technical change. Hence 
we have: 
1/2 (pt + pt+1)T [(yt+1 - yRE 
t+1) - (yt - yE)] = 
+ 1/2 (pt + pt+1)T [(yt+1 - yD) - (yt - yC)] Operating efficiency effect
 
t
+ 1/2 (pt + pt+1)T [(yD - yRE )] (11)
t+1) - (yC - yRE Allocative efficiency effect 
t+ 1/2 (pt + pt+1)T (yE - yRE ). Effect of technical change 
We should remember that yC and yD are Debreu-Farrel technically efficient vectors. As Fig­
ure 2 shows, the operating efficiency effect measures the impact on revenues of any distancing 
from or approach to the production frontier that is produced in the period t+1 with regard to t. Al­
locative efficiency on the other hand measures the effect of the changes produced between the pe­
riod t and t +1 in the distance between the technically efficient radial projection into the frontier 
and that which corresponds to the maximum revenues given the prices for each period21. As the 
distribution companies have to supply the energy demanded, and unit reimbursements associated 
with the different outputs are ultimately decided by the regulator (see Section 3.1), we can consid­
er that a correct regulating mechanism should be able to apply a system of relative compensations 
close to the situation of operating efficiency. In fact, it might seem that the greater the discrepan­
cy between operating efficiency and allocative efficiency, the worse the regulating mechanism. 
The sum of the two effects: operating efficiency and allocative efficiency are represented in Fig­
tures 1 and 2 by [(yt+1 – yRE )], using in both cases arithmetic mean output price weights.
t+1) - (yt – yRE 
tWith regard to how technical change affects revenues, we should remember that yRE and 
yE are operating and allocative efficient vectors (see Figure 2). Note that in both definitions 
tthe price vector used is the same. Therefore the movement from yRE to y
E expresses the 
movement of the production frontier, as for example the technical change that may be non-
neutral, as in the case of Figure 2. The difference between the two vectors is again evaluat­
ed using arithmetic mean output price weights, and measures the contribution of technolog­
ical progress in terms of revenues. 
4. Implementing the Decomposition of the Bennet Revenue Indicator 
The calculation of the Bennet indicators proposed in (9) requires information about (yt, xt, 
pt) and (yt+1, xt+1, pt+1), and this data are potentially observable. However, the decomposition 
of the Bennet quantity indicator presented in expressions (10) and (11) require the additional 
tuse of vectors (yRE , yRE 
t+1, yC, yD, yE), which are not observable and have to be calculated. To 
do so we will use linear programming techniques know as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
initially proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). What this technique does is to com­
pare each of the distribution companies with the best practice observed in the sample. 
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Normally, in DEA analysis, the technology of period t is constructed from the data on 
input and output quantities for all the producers in that period t. From this point of view, the 
information existing in periods prior to t is not used. In this study our aim is to follow a dif­
ferent approach, which Tulkens and Vanden Eeckaut (1995) have dubbed sequential. Sequen­
tial frontiers enable the technology of period t to be constructed from the data on input and 
output quantities of all the companies in all the previous periods, including period t itself. This 
type of analysis rules out technical regress, such as total or partial lowering of the production 
frontier, a situation that adapts fully to electricity distribution. With this approach we can de­
fine the set of production possibilities as: 
sTt = {(y, x): y  Σiλiyi s, x  Σiλixi , λi  0, s = 1,…,t}. (12) 
where (y,x) is an upper-bounded piece-wise-linear surface (frontier) constructed by the 
union of the observations that define the best practice observed for all the years from 1 to t 
inclusively. Expression (12) defines a technology with constant returns to scale, since the 
sum of the λs can take any value. We should not consider this hypothesis as being restric­
tive, since the literature indicates that economies of scale are rapidly exhausted in the distri­
bution activity (see for example, Salvanes and Tjotta, 1994). 
The calculation of the effect of operating efficiency on (11) involves identifying the vec­
tors of quantity yC and yD that are technical efficient in the Debreu-Farrel sense. To calcu­
late yC we solve the following linear programming problem for each electricity distributor i 
= 1,…,º,…, It, in each year, t = 1,…,T. 
yºCt/ yºt = maxθ θ 
ss.a. θyºt  Σiλiyi s, xºt  Σiλixi , λi  0. (13) 
Similarly, as yD is a radial expansion of yt+1, yD = θyt+1 with θ ≥1. The scalar θ is deter­
mined as a solution to a linear programming problem identical to (13), replacing the data (ys, 
xs, yot, xot), with the data, (ys+1, xs+1, yot+1, xot+1). 
Calculating the allocative efficiency effect of expression (12) involves identifying the 
t tquantity vector yRE and yRE maximizes the revenues obtained with the inputs x
t,t+1, where yRE 
when the reimbursements given by the regulator are pt, and with the technology sequential 
tuntil period t. To calculate yRE we solve the following linear mathematical program for each 
electricity distributor i = 1,...,º,..., It, in each year, t = 1,…,T.22 
maxy pº
ty 
ss.a. y  Σiλiyi s, xºt  Σiλixi , λi  0, (14) 
In the case of yRE 
t+1, this quantity vector would maximize revenues using inputs xt+1, with 
the reimbursements per output given by pt+1 and with the sequential technology to the peri­
od t +1. Thus yRE 
t+1 can be identified as a solution to a linear programming problem identical 
to (14), replacing the data (ys, xs, xot, pot) with the data (ys+1, xs+1, xot+1, pot+1). 
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In addition, we should identify vector yE, which, together with y t t+1 RE and yRE will
allow us to determine the activity effect described in (10) and the technical change 
effect described in (11). Because yE maximizes the revenues obtained using xt, when 
the reimbursements on the regulated outputs are pt and the sequential technology 
until period t+1. yE can be identified as a solution to a linear programming problem 
identical to (14) in which the data (ys, xs, xot, pot) is replaced with the mixed data 
(ys+1, xs+1, xot, pot). 
By solving each of the five linear programming problems defined by (13) and (14) I 
times, once for each distributing company in the sample, all the information required to iden­
tify the five output vectors is generated (yt , yt+1, yC, yD ERE RE , y ). When these are combined with 
the vectors of observed outputs (yt, yt+1) and with the unitary reimbursement vectors (pt, 
pt+1), the change observed in the total amount of standard costs (CSt+1 – CSt), for each of the 
electricity distributing companies, can be decomposed into the six components shown by ex­
pressions (9), (10) and (11). 
5. The Data 
The data used in this study describe the distribution activities of the most important 
Spanish companies, which were those regulated by means of the MLE: Eléctrica del 
Viesgo S.A., Eléctricas Reunidas de Zaragozanas S.A., Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña 
S.A., Hidroeléctrica Española S.A., Hidroeléctrica de Cataluña S.A., Hidroeléctrica del 
Cantábrico S.A., Hidroeléctrica Ribagorzana S.A., Iberduero, Iberdrola, Sevillana de 
Electricidad S.A. and Unión Fenosa S.A., from 1952 up until 1997. With this data we 
have built up an unbalanced panel, which includes 144 observations. This extensive pe­
riod has been divided into two parts: 1988-1997, when the MLE was officially in effect, 
and which is the object of this study, and the period prior to this: 1952-1987. For this 
latter period, we have 61 observations, which we used to define the initial best practice 
technology. 
As we have commented in the previous section, in order to design the revenues model 
that we intend to apply we have constructed sequential frontiers, by accumulating informa­
tion from the year 1952 to the year 1987, and subsequently adding the data for every year 
up to 1997. We have therefore ensured that there is enough information to adequately con­
struct each of the production frontiers for the period 1988–97. This will allow us to calcu­
late the decomposition of the Bennet quantity indicator presented in expressions (10) and 
(11). It is impossible to apply the methodology of the Bennet indicators to the previous 
stage, 1952 – 87, since for this time we only have information on physical quantities but 
not for revenues per output. 
The data has been obtained from various sources. Company records and the annual re­
ports of the Ministry of Industry and Energy have provided us with information on the out­
puts supplied by the companies during the period 1952-1987, and on the inputs used for 
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the whole period, 1952-1997. The data on outputs for the period 1987-1997 and the total 
sums paid by the regulator in the aforementioned period has been obtained from the de­
tailed annual reports drawn up by the now defunct “Oficina de Compensaciones de la En­
ergía Eléctrica“ (OFICO). This information has recently been published by Red Eléctrica 
de España (2006). 
Defining the quantities of outputs and inputs 
As for the choice of the variables to include in the model, there are two aspects that con­
dition this. Firstly, the regulatory framework: the object of study is the MLE, which, as we 
have seen, defines some outputs upon which it bases its reimbursement system. This set of 
four outputs, discussed in Sub-section 2.1, is that which defines the outputs used in applica­
tion, since the companies’ revenues depend exclusively on these. However, we have certain 
informative restrictions due to the fact that part of the data corresponds to the period 1952­
1987. The need to have information prior to the MLE’s period of validity has forced us to 
aggregate the electricity delivered in high and medium voltage. This is because numerous 
changes in the tariff structure took place over this period, as well as to its nomenclature. Con­
sequently some concepts were at one time considered high-voltage and at another medium 
voltage, thereby preventing uniformity in the series. Hence the outputs and the inputs used 
in application are the following: 
Outputs: 
(i) Number of subscribers that each distributor supplies, expressed in millions. 
(ii) Electricity delivered at high and medium voltage, expressed in Gw/h. 
(iii) Electricity delivered at low voltage, expressed in Gw/h. 
Inputs: 
(i) High voltage distribution lines (between 36kv and 132kv), expressed in kilometers. 
(ii) Medium voltage distribution lines (between 1kv and 36kv), expressed in kilome­
ters. 
(iii) Low voltage distribution lines (< 1kv), expressed in kilometers. 
(iv) Transformer capacity from high to high voltage, and from high to medium voltage; 
and additionally, transformer capacity from medium to low voltage, expressed in 
MVA. 
It would have been interesting to include work as an input. However, historically, the 
electricity companies were integrated vertically, making it impossible to obtain the specific 
data for the distribution activity23. In addition, it was not thought suitable to introduce qual­
ity of service as a variable since: i) as indicated in Section 2, the reimbursements that the 
companies received did not depend on the levels of quality attained; ii) the data available on 
the quality of the service for the period 1988-1997 presents serious doubts regarding its con­
struction and comparability between companies. We shall return to these aspects in the next 
section, when we discuss the results. 
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In order to check the reliability of the data compiled before applying it, an analysis was 
carried out aimed at detecting possible outliers. For this we applied the method proposed by 
Fox et al. (2004). This method allows the detection of outliers due both to the scale of the 
observation and to the combination of the inputs used. In the database used, no observations 
were detected that might be considered extreme in either of the two senses. This means that, 
although the previously defined models of mathematical programming are deterministic, we 
know that they are applied to data that behaves correctly. 
Defining the reimbursement of the outputs 
With regard to determining reimbursements, we have already seen throughout this study 
that the MLE reimburses the companies for their standard costs. Thus, the reimbursements 
for an output derive from the aforementioned costs, which are in turn the ones that determine 
their revenues24. The method use to determine the reimbursements for each of the outputs 
was the following: i) the price of the output number of subscribers was determined by means 
of the quotient between the standard commercial costs recognized by the regulator for this 
concept and the number of subscribers; ii) we defined the price corresponding to the output 
energy distributed in high and medium voltage by taking as a reference the total standard 
costs (fixed and operating) that the MLE allocates to these activities. The sum of these costs 
divided by the number of GW/h distributed in those voltages gives us the price of the out­
put; and (iii) similarly, we determined the price for the output energy distributed in low volt­
age, as the quotient between the sum of the fixed and operating standard costs and the num­
ber of Gw/h distributed in low voltage. 
Statistics of the variables 
Table 2 displays the statistics of the average data for the variables included in the 
model during the period analyzed, 1988-1997. Several considerations need to be taken 
into account when observing this data. Firstly, that there is a major dispersion in the sizes 
of the companies included in the sample. Secondly, we should point out that the merger 
between Iberduero and Hidroeléctrica Española that took place in 1991, which gave rise 
to Iberdrola, changed the structure of the sector significantly. This is mainly because it 
contributed to a substantial increase in concentration, as these two were the largest com­
panies in 1990. This means that the increase between 1990 and 1991 observed in the sta­
tistics of the average company between these years is simply due the fact that the quan­
tities were distributed among fewer companies. Both for the outputs and for the inputs, 
we see that all variables grow, on average, in all the years. As for the inputs, it is worth 
stressing that some of the most significant variations seen in Table 2 may reflect ex­
changes of assets between companies or operations between the companies and RE­
DESA, the public high voltage transport corporation25. It should also be noted that the 
average number of subscribers grew for all the years considered, except 1994, with a de-
crease due to asset exchange26. Lastly, when analyzing the statistics for the unit reim­
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bursements we see that important variations exist over the whole period for all the out­
puts, especially for high-voltage, which simply reflect the changes produced in the leg­
islation (see Table1). The consequences of these changes will be analyzed in detail in the 
next section. 
Table 2 
AVERAGE STATISTICS FOR SPANISH ELECTRICITY 
DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES: 1988-1997 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
OUTPUTS 
y1 Subcribers 
(millions) 
1.98 2.03 2.07 2.48 2.51 2.55 2.51 2.55 2.59 2.64 
y2 Electricity 
(AT+MT) (GWh) 
7,498 8,041 7,807 9,683 9,692 9,451 9,368 9,971 9,937 10,566 
y3 Electricity 
(BT) (GWh) 
5,498 6,072 6,411 8,036 8,241 8,375 8,566 8,693 9,156 9,331 
INPUTS 
x1 Km AT 5,949 5,967 5,980 6,952 7,035 7,084 7,103 7,162 7,300 7,397 
x2 Km MT 18,038 18,522 19,398 23,373 23,935 24,288 25,070 25,664 27,075 27,530 
x3 Km BT 24,498 25,142 26,366 31,329 32,408 32,914 33,731 34,649 35,362 36,035 
x4 Capacity (MVA) 19,428 19,869 20,691 24,500 25,523 24,944 24,860 25,503 26,732 27,500 
PRICES (current €) 
p1 Subcribers 16.69 17.49 18.61 19.47 20.48 18.72 19.51 22.06 21.44 26.84 
p2 Electricity 
(AT+MT) (c€) 
1.61 1.69 1.88 1.95 2.12 2.19 2.19 2.28 2.31 2.24 
pY3 Electricity 
(BT) (c€) 
0.86 0.90 0.94 0.98 1.02 1.05 1.09 1.14 1.15 1.15 
6. Results 
The results obtained after applying the model are set out in Tables 3 and 4. When 
presenting them, we followed the approach taken by Försund and Hjalmarsson (1979) 
who propose studying an industrial sector by defining an ‘average’ company that they 
consider representative of the sector. We can see that in the methodological context de­
fined in this study, characterized by a Bennet indicator, the ‘average’ is the arithmetical 
one. Försund and Kittelsen (1998) use this approach to analyze the behavior of Norwe­
gian electricity distribution, and Arozena and Waddams Price (2002) for the case of 
electricity generation in Spain. Thus, the results presented below refer to the average 
electricity distribution company. In addition, the results calculated for the case of the av­
erage company, expression (9), multiplied by the number of companies, are equal to 
those of the sector as a whole. Furthermore, Fox (2006: 80) shows that using the aver­
age company allows a Bennet indicator to be made transitive, a property that makes it 
possible to make multilateral comparisons between companies. We have not employed 
this property in this study. 
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Table 3 
DESCOMPOSITION OF THE AVERAGE COMPAN’S REVENUE CHANGE PER
 
OUTPUT: BENNET PRICE AND QUANTITY INDICATORS
 
(millions of current euros)
 
1989-88 1990-89 1991-90 1992-91 1993-92 1994-93 1995-94 1996-95 1997-96 1997-88 
Revenue Change 25.26 18.79 17.58 25.06 2.11 4.19 35.78 7.95 23.84 17.84 
Reimbursement 
Effect 
10.37 19.23 10.46 22.10 5.22 4.75 19.99 2.43 6.29 11.20 
p1 Subcribers 1.60 2.31 1.71 2.51 –4.45 2.00 6.44 –1.60 14.16 2,74 
p2 Electricity 
delivered (AT+MT) 
6.45 14.39 6.73 16.42 7.04 –0.03 8.84 2.99 –0.01 6.04 
p3 Electricity 
delivered (BT) 
2.31 2.80 2.03 3.17 2.63 2.79 4.71 1.04 0.31 2.42 
Bennet Quantity 14.90 –0.43 7.12 2.96 –3.11 –0.57 15.79 5.52 17.55 6.64 
y1 Subcribers 0.87 0.63 0.46 0.72 0.70 –0.78 0.87 0.99 1.21 0.63 
y2 Electricity 
delivered (AT+MT) 
8.99 –4.18 2.33 0.19 –5.20 –1.83 13.50 –0.78 14.32 3.04 
y3 Electricity 
delivered (BT) 
5.05 3.12 4.34 2.05 1.39 2.04 1.42 5.30 2.02 2.97 
The first thing that the results in Table 3 reveal is that the standard costs associated 
with the distribution activity grew every year from 1988 to 1997. This growth trough was 
not uniform due to the changes that occurred in the legislation and in the economic situa­
tion in the country throughout the period. On average, the average company’s yearly 
growth in revenues was somewhat higher than 6.5%. In absolute terms, this means an av­
erage increase of 17.84 million euros. Once this first approach was completed, we pro­
ceeded to analyze the decomposition of the difference in revenues between a Bennet reim­
bursement indicator and one for quantity described in expression (9). We observed that for 
most years the Bennet reimbursement indicator contributed to a greater extent to the ob­
taining of revenues than the quantity indicator, apart from the years 1988-1989, 1995-1996 
and 1996-1997. The proportion was around 62% and 38% respectively, for the average of 
the period. 
The Bennet Reimbursement Indicator 
In an analysis of the Bennet price indicator by output we see that, in most years, the out­
put that contributed most to the obtaining of revenues has been energy in high and medium 
voltage, with an average increase of over half the variation observed in the reimbursement. 
This fact is especially noteworthy before 1993, the date of the first significant modification 
of the MLE (see Table 1). In fact, this first revision of the MLE divides the study period into 
two clearly differentiated sub-periods: that of 1988-1992, and of 1993-1997. 
Of this aggregated output, high voltage plus medium voltage, we can say that the con­
tribution of the Bennet indicator to high-voltage reimbursements was higher than that for 
medium voltage, in a proportion of approximately 70% to 30%. This seems logical when we 
137 Multi-Output Compensation System in Electricity Distribution: The Case of Spain 
look at the legislation, since the regulation in medium voltage was fairly closed in all its 
facets, as pointed out in Sub-section 2.1. In contrast, the modifications in the reimbursements 
of high-voltage were frequent, for two main reasons: i) the variation, on several occasions, 
that the criterion for calculating the rate of return on capital, which is reflected in the results; 
ii) the increase in the standard costs recognized. It should be remembered that we have cal­
culated the reimbursement associated with these voltages as the quotient between the stan­
dard costs paid and the energy distributed. The increase in the numerator, standard costs, was 
produced basically due to the recognition of new high-voltage facilities, and especially trans­
former substations, since the standard costs for these facilities are calculated in terms of 
physical units and not of circulated energy. For the system as a whole, there was an increase 
of 23.23% in transformation capacity for the period 1988-1992, signifying a yearly growth 
rate of approximately 5.4%. If we look at the results per company, we can see that of the four 
companies with highest growth in substations, three of them correspond to those that have 
the highest proportions of energy supplied over the whole of the system. In contrast, the in-
crease in transformation capacity is only 4.56% for the whole period 1993-1997, signifying 
a yearly growth rate of a little over 1%. This result suggests that the incentive for recogniz­
ing new standard costs associated with high-voltage practically disappeared with the revision 
of the MLE carried out in 1993. 
Given these results, we believe that the MLE introduced incentives for companies to 
bring investments forward, i.e. by putting facilities into operation, specifically substa­
tions, which according to the forecast demand would not be needed until well into the fu­
ture. As we shall see, this behavior affected the efficiency and productivity levels of dis­
tributors, since they put into operation facilities that were used beneath the levels 
considered optimum. This aspect had a positive side-effect, which was the increase in the 
quality of the service, especially over the 1988-1994 period, in which the economic in­
centives associated with improvement were non-existent, as we have seen in Sub-section 
2.1. Lastly, we can see from this analysis of the reimbursement effect that in the 1988­
1992 period the increases in reimbursements for high and medium voltage were higher 
than the rates of inflation. 
This result does not corroborate the theoretical conclusions about the MLE arrived at 
by Laffont and Crampes (1995). These authors drew up their model assuming that the out­
puts associated with distribution were identically regulated, coming to the theoretical con­
clusion that the level of ex-ante effort associated with investment would be less than the 
optimum one. However in this study we noticed that companies had an incentive to over­
invest during the period 1988-1992, since it was a way of increasing revenues by means 
of higher standard costs. We shall return to this aspect in the Conclusions to the study. 
Lastly, regarding high and medium voltage energy, it should be pointed out that the strong 
negative contribution for the period 1996-97 is due to the drop in inflation in Spain, falling 
from 3.6% in 1996 to 2% in 1997, which led to a reduction in the reimbursement for both 
high and medium voltage, since both were linked to this index. In particular for medium 
voltage, on discounting 3% from the RPI in the updating of operating costs in 1997, this 
update became negative. 
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The contribution of low voltage to the increase in standard costs was somewhat high­
er than 20%, and the number of subscribers close to 25%. As for the number of sub­
scribers, Table 3 shows the variations caused by the contradictory legislative revisions of 
1993, 1995 and 1997 already mentioned in Sub-section 2.1. Table 3 shows the consider­
able decrease represented by the 1993 revision, which was followed by those of 1995 and 
1997. These later revisions were associated with increases that were much higher than the 
inflation rate for the period. Thus we see that the negative high and medium voltage re­
imbursement effect for these years is seen to be compensated by the number of sub­
scribers, due to the reform in which an incentive for demand management was added to 
these costs. 
The Bennet Quantity Indicator 
Decomposition per variable 
In Table 3 the analysis of the quantity effect shows us that its progress is closely 
linked to the country’s economic situation, and more specifically to industrial activity. 
One of the most stable outputs in Table 2 is the number of subscribers, being the one that 
contributes least to the quantity effect, representing on average 9.5% of the observed rev­
enues increase. Low voltage energy is also revealed to be relatively stable, contributing 
45% to the total average increase. Its progress reflects the sustained increase in low volt­
age consumption by households. For its part, the contribution of energy distributed in 
high and medium voltages is somewhat higher than that of low voltage. However, it is the 
output that suffers most alterations throughout the period, which is quite logical if we 
consider that industrial activity is much more sensitive to the ups and downs of the eco­
nomic situation. Thus we can see how the periods of deceleration of the Spanish econo­
my are reflected in the years 1989-90, 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1995-96. We shall contin­
ue by examining the Bennet quantity indicator from another perspective, in terms of the 
decomposition displayed in Table 4, which sets out the methodology presented in Sub­
section 3.2. 
Economic Decomposition 
Table 4 shows us that the factor that has contributed most to the Bennet quantity indica­
tor has been the activity effect, which measures the potential that the availability of a greater 
quantity of inputs has meant in terms of generating new revenues. We have calculated that 
the average potential growth of new revenues associated with greater availability of facili­
ties is 12.54 million euros. However, this potential was drastically reduced by the continual 
losses of productivity observed during the period, and which, on average, meant a decrease 
in revenues of 5.91 million euros. The sum of these two distant values makes the average 
value of the Bennet quantity indicator 6.64 million euros. In the same way, Table 4 reveals 
that the fall in productivity was caused fundamentally by a loss of operating efficiency 
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which, as we can see, deteriorated dramatically in most years, and especially during the pe­
riod 1988-1994. The individual results for the distribution companies do not show a differ­
ent behavior to that for the average company. 
Table 4 
DESCOMPOSITION OF THE QUANTITY BENNET INDICATOR, 
AVERAGE COMPANY 
(millions of current euros) 
1989-88 1990-89 1991-90 1992-91 1993-92 1994-93 1995-94 1996-95 1997-96 1997-88 
Quantity Bennet 14.90 –0.43 7.12 2.96 –3.11 –0.57 15.79 5.52 17.55 6.64 
Activity Effect 7.60 15.32 19.43 16.53 2.45 8.56 14.36 16.13 12.46 12.54 
Productivity Effect 7.30 –15.75 –12.31 –13.57 –5.56 –9.13 1.42 –10.61 5.08 –5.91 
Technical Change 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Operating 
3.20 –9.34 –9.27 –10.52 0.75 –10.21 –4.26 –5.39 3.32 –4.64
Efficiency 
Allocative 
4.10 –6.41 –3.05 –3.05 –6.30 1.09 5.69 –5.22 1.76 –1.27
Efficiency 
Crampes and Laffont (1995) came to the conclusion that, in an ex-post situation, the 
MLE provided incentives for companies to operate efficiently, i.e. to maximize the output­
inputs ratio. They considered that this result could become distorted for two reasons: i) if 
mergers or takeovers took place and the industry concentration rose; ii) if the agent, upon 
choosing its level of effort, knew (or suspected) that standard costs would be adjusted down­
wards to embrace the reduction of real costs associated with operating efficiency. For these 
authors, because the MLE did not contemplate any pre-established reviewing procedures, 
and it was unlikely that standards costs would not be reviewed, the theoretical result of 
analysis could be seen to be altered. 
It is possible that the sector’s concentration helps to explain the results of the persistent 
deterioration in operating efficiency. This is because, as we have seen, the two biggest com­
panies in the sector merged: Hidroeléctrica Española and Iberduero. On the other hand, we 
believe that the method of revision must have played an important role, and that the MLE 
was, from 1993 onwards, the object of almost yearly revision (see Table 1). However, in our 
opinion the main cause explaining the negative levels of operating efficiency is the behavior 
of the companies, which was aimed at increasing the standard costs recognized for high volt­
age by putting new facilities into operation27, 28. We have already commented that we be­
lieve that companies brought investments forward. Investments which, according to the evo­
lution in demand, should have been made later if the aim was to use them at a suitable 
capacity. The decline in operating efficiency, especially in the 1988-1994 period, reflects a 
fall in the input-output ratio. 
As we have seen in Sub-section 2.1, the quality of the service was never one of the reg­
ulator’s objectives. In 1994, for the first time, a timid reimbursement was made for invest­
ments aimed at improving the quality of the medium and low voltage supply. This incentive 
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was later withdrawn in the revision of the electricity system carried out in 2000. We have 
calculated that the revenues obtained by the companies for quality improvement represent­
ed 0.7% of the total in 1994, and 1.1% annually in the 1995-1997 period. However, every­
thing seems to indicate that this improved notably during the MLE, and especially in the 
1988-1994 period. The quality of the supply has historically been measured in Spain by the 
Installed Power Equivalent Interruption Time - Tiempo de Interrupción Equivalente de la 
Potencia Instalada” (TIEPI), defined by the ratio between the medium and low voltage elec­
tricity distributed and the distributed medium and low voltage electricity lost due to un­
planned interruptions. The lower the TEIPI, the higher the quality of the service. Graph 1 
shows the progress of the TIEPI for the average company from 1987 to 1997. We can see 
that the TIEPI went from 9.70 in 1987 to 3.88 in 1994, and finally to 3.25 in 1997. We are 
thus faced with a rare case of positive externality. Although the economic incentive aimed 
at improving the quality of the supply was practically non-existent, this improved with the 
operationalization of new facilities whose main aim was to increase revenues, i.e. the stan­
dard costs recognized by the regulator. UNESA (1997) also considers that the most influen­
tial factor in the observed increase in quality was the high investment in transport and distri­
bution facilities made by the electricity companies throughout this period. 
Graph 1. Service quality evolution for the average company 
The TIEPI results in Graph 1 should be considered indicative. López (2006) points out 
that the TIEPI data supplied by the companies was never audited, and that there is no guar­
antee that these were calculated using a procedure that was homogenous in time and between 
them. Under these circumstances, there is no guarantee that the TIEPI results supplied by the 
companies were an objective reflection of the real supply rather than a figure used in their 
own interest. Despite this, everything seems to indicate that quality improved, especially in 
the period from 1988 to 1994. 
It should also be stressed that during the period that the MLE was in force there was no 
movement of the best practice production frontier, i.e. no technical change took place. As we 
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have explained in Sections 3 and 4, in this study we have used a sequential-type technology. 
In this type of technology the information accumulates, and is never lost. For the production 
possibility frontier to move would require new observations so as to have a better output­
input ratio than the preceding one. If this does not occur, there is no technical change. As 
companies put into operation facilities that were not initially used at their optimum level, this 
ratio worsened during the 1988-1997 period. This is the reason we did not observe technical 
change, whereas we did observe operating inefficiency. It is to be expected that we should 
observe movements at the production frontier, i.e. technical change, when the increase in de­
mand causes the new facilities, put into operation mainly during the1988-1994 period, to be 
used with greater intensity. 
Lastly we have to report that to the loss of operating efficiency must be added, in over 
half of the observed years, a loss of allocative efficiency in distribution activity. However, 
on average this negative effect is much lower than that for operating inefficiency. Neverthe­
less, allocative efficiency deserves special interest insofar as it may be a direct consequence 
of the system of reimbursement established by the MLE, in the sense that the companies 
have a limited capacity to manage their markets. It is therefore the regulator who is respon­
sible for providing the companies with a price mechanism that reflects the relative demand 
for electricity. As we have seen throughout this study, the regulator changed some of the 
compensations in a contradictory way. Therefore, to the MLE’s aforementioned weakness­
es and regulatory failures, we should now add an inability to create a system of relative in­
centives that was close to the demand structure. 
7. Conclusions 
In this study, we have analyzed the regulation of the Spanish electricity system in force 
between 1988 and 1997 for the activity of electricity distribution, known as the Marco Legal 
Estable (MLE). This system of incentives, developed in a complicated legal framework 
throughout the ten years of its validity, is not easy to classify. 
The analysis of the MLE for the activity of electricity distribution has been carried out 
in a dynamic and multi-output context. This was done using a new economic model based 
on a Bennet revenues indicator, which has allowed us to study, over time, the behavior of 
each of the regulated products. Using this approach, we have introduced and analyzed the 
idea of ‘partial’ renegotiation, in the sense that the companies have not sought an overall 
renegotiation of the system of regulation, as many theoretical models assume. Rather, they 
have exploited the weaknesses of the system by identifying and applying pressure to its 
weakest points, which only affect partial and apparently unimportant aspects of the regula­
tory system. In our opinion, the Achilles’ heel of the MLE was the regulation of high-volt­
age facilities, where everything seems to indicate that, up until the first review in 1993, the 
electricity companies obtained substantial and sustained increases of revenues by negotiat­
ing the rates of return on high-voltage investment and the recognition of new facilities, 
specifically, sub-stations. The remuneration for these facilities was not associated with their 
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use, but merely with their existence. This situation was encouraged by the fact that it was the 
regional government that approved the new facilities, while it was the Ministry of Industry 
and Energy which provided the reimbursements for them. The exploitation of this partial 
weakness of the regulatory system led the companies to engage in a behavior aimed at ob­
taining new forms of revenues, i.e. the recognition of new standard costs. Thus the compa­
nies were given an incentive to bring forward investments, such as put into operation facili­
ties which, according to the forecast demand, would not be needed until well into the future. 
This has led to a systematic and sustained loss of productivity in the sector, due basically to 
an over-capacity in certain inputs. However, with the first reform of the MLE in 1993, the 
economic incentives to invest in facilities practically disappeared, thereby slowing down the 
companies’ rate of investment. This, together with the uninterrupted growth in demand, may 
be the reason why there is currently no talk of over-capacity in the sector but of lack of in­
vestment in electricity distribution. 
Another aspect we would like to highlight is that everything seems to indicate that the qual­
ity of the service improved ostensibly during the MLE, especially in the period from 1988 to 
1994. This fact should be interpreted as a positive side-effect of the implementation of the new 
facilities. This improvement in the quality of the service in fact constitutes a rare case of posi­
tive externality, since the first timid economic incentive to improve quality was introduced in 
1994. Quality has always been a secondary objective for the regulator. The economic incentive 
provided by this concept represented only about 1% of the companies’ total revenues, and was 
withdrawn with the revision of the Spanish electricity system carried out in 2000. 
The regulator changed the criteria for reimbursing high-voltage in 1993, but in subse­
quent years, modified the reimbursement for other products that had made a more modest 
contribution to the electricity companies’ increases in revenues. It is curious to observe the 
contradictory way that the regulator changed the reimbursement for the product “number of 
subscribers”. The reimbursement for this item was adjusted downwards in 1993, only to be 
increased markedly in 1995 and 1997 so that this compensated to a large extent for the loss 
of revenues associated with the reviewing of high medium and low voltages. The behavior 
described may reveal a real instance of the distributing companies influencing the regulator, 
although this aspect should be the object of further research. 
In addition, we found that no movement of the best practice production frontier took 
place during the period that the MLE was in force, i.e. no technical change took place. This 
result agrees with that described above, since in order for there to be technical change, the out­
put-input ratio needs to be better than the preceding ones, and this condition cannot be ful­
filled when the new facilities are not initially used at their optimum level. In addition, the high 
levels of allocative inefficiency suggest the regulator was incapable of providing the compa­
nies with a reimbursement mechanism that reflected the relative demand for electricity. 
Finally, we would like to stress that the results of our empirical research seem to coin­
cide very little with Crampes and Laffont’s theoretical results (1995). These authors created 
a model for the MLE, and believed that it could be considered some kind of yardstick com­
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petition in which reimbursement based on the average costs of the sector was replaced by 
standard costs. However they warned that this change introduced by the Spanish regulator in 
fact meant abandoning the anonymity of the yardstick system, and allowed the possibility of 
the costs recognized and paid for by the regulator might be manipulated by the company. To 
avoid this possibility, they pointed out that an extremely strict control of the regulation sys­
tem was needed, together with clearly established procedures in the reviewing and updating 
systems. Throughout this study we have provided ample evidence that the recommendations 
made by Crampes and Laffont were not complied with. It is not therefore surprising that 
there is little agreement between the behavior of the parties involved that was theoretically 
predicted by these authors and the empirical results found in this study. 
Notes 
1.	 In fact, Electricity Law 40/1994 was enacted in 1994, however the majority of its proposals were never put 
into force. 
2.	 In the “White Book on the regulatory framework of electricity generation in Spain” by Pérez Arriaga (2005) 
we can read: “(…) wish to point out here the absence of a procedure for remunerating the activity of distribu­
tion that responds to even the most elementary regulatory principles: an individualized treatment of the com­
panies and association of the remuneration to the level demanded by the quality of the service and to the in­
vestments needed and carried out. The Spanish procedure for remunerating the activity of distribution is 
clearly one of the most deficient in the international context”. (Page 67, Note 48). Similarly, the CNE has in­
dicated on numerous occasions that it is still necessary to justify the retributive recognized base to the activi­
ty of distribution, which the applicable ground rules have not resolved. See, for example Report 16/2002 or 
the CNE's Report 7/2004. 
3.	 In fact, for those distributors who carried out their activity under the MLE, the ESL took that existing up until 
1997 as the basis for their reimbursement. 
4.	 See, for example, Report 23/2007 concerning the Royal Decree proposal for regulating the activity of electri­
cal energy distribution, drawn up by the CNE. 
5.	 In the context of this study, we cannot assume duality between the production function and that of costs, since 
the duality is fulfilled under highly restrictive conditions (Grifell - Tatjé (1990)). 
6.	 Other studies that have used the DEA to analyze electricity distribution are: Hjalmarson and Veiderpass (1992 
a,b) Pollit (1995), Bagadadioglu, Price and Weyman-Jones (1996), Zhang and Bartels (1998), Forsund and 
Kittelsen (1998). 
7.	 For a view of the contemporary and legal background of the MLE, see for example Ontiveros (1986), San 
Pedro (1986), and Ariño and López de Castro (1998). 
8.	 A system was established for correcting deviations, which, due to their relevance, may have a bearing on the 
companies’ revenues as a consequence of the provisional character of the parameters and values that have been 
used to calculate the rate. The M.O. of December 19th 1988 indicated what these parameters were and de­
scribed under what terms the corrections were made. 
9.	 For a more detailed analysis of the calculation of the reimbursement rate, we recommend Rojas (1994). 
10.	 In the event that the facility only affected the region which is called “Autonomous Community”. See Article 
149 of the Spanish Constitution. 
11.	 In both cases, the standard costs were established by differentiating three voltage ranges: (i) 36 kV≤Voltage< 
72.5 kV; (ii) 72.5 kV≤Voltage <145 kV; y (iii) 145 kV≤Voltage. 
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12. The energy circulated at a voltage level is defined as the aggregate of the energy distributed to the end users

at this voltage level and that distributed at lower voltage levels, affected by a loss factor.
 
13. Medium voltage is considered that between 1 kV and 36 kV; with low voltage being considered that below

1 kV.
 
14. CBTt = CBT(t-1) * [1 + (0.75 * (0.5 * RPI + 0.5 * IPPI))] 
CMTt = CMT(t-1) * [1 + (0.75 * (0.5 * RPI + 0.5 * IPPI))]
 
where: CBT : standard fixed unit costs at low voltage for the period t; CBTt (t-1): standard fixed unit costs at

low voltage for the period t-1; CMTt: standard fixed unit costs at medium voltage for the period t; CMT(t-1):are

the standard fixed unit costs at medium voltage for the period t-;. RPI: retail price index, and IPPI: industrial

product price index.
 
15. CBTt = CBT(t-1) * [1 + (0.75 * (0.5 * RPI + 0.5 * IPPI))]
 
where (0.5 * RPI + 0.5 * IPPI) is an index of adjusted prices, which we shall refer to as IP.
 
CBTt = CBT(t-1) * [1 + 0.75 * IP]
 
Re-ordering the previous expression, we have:
 
CBT 1 CBT − CBT CBT − CBT− 1 1  = +[ 0  . 75  IP −1 ] = 0 7. 5  IP,    t t−1 = (1 − 0 2. 5  )IP = IP − 0  .25  IP,   t t −1 = IP − X
CBT t−1 CBT t −1 CBTt−1 
where X = 0.25*(0.5*RPI + 0.5*RPI) 
Similarly, we would obtain the previous expression for medium voltage. Thus the regulation of the fixed costs 
for low and medium voltages applies the price cap criteria and introduces a discount factor of 25%, although 
the legislation does not specify it clearly in this way. 
16. Cgcd = ψ* Na*CNa + (1 - ψ)Pc * CPc 
where: Cgcd: standard cost of commercial management of the system; y: unit adjustment coefficient for the 
number of subscriber policies, Na: standard number of subscriber policies in the system; CNa: standard cost in 
pesetas per subscriber policy; Pc: standard power subscribed at voltages equal to or higher than 1 kV, in Kw; 
CPa: standard costs of power subscribed in pesetas/kW. 
17. In the literature dealing with regulation, these monetary adjustments are usually referred to as “transfers”. Here 
we have used the term ‘compensations’ since this is the term used by the MLE legislation. 
18. In the M.O. December 22nd 1988, the Administration published the updated values (dated December 31st 
1988), of the standard gross and net values added to December 31 1987 and the provisional ones to Decem­
ber 31st 1988, for each of the high voltage distribution facilities that were in service at that time and that 
would have entered into service prior to January 1st 1988. This evaluation was performed using the informa­
tion sent by the various sub-systems and refers to the technical characteristics of the facilities and the date 
they are put into service. 
19. The revenues are defined by the standard costs recognized by the regulator (Expression (2)). However, due to 
the correction set out in Expression (4), these may experience a certain variation depending on whether the 
company collects a higher or lower quantity than that calculated using the average rate for the sector. The per­
product decomposition of this correction is not available, which is why it has not been taken into account in 
the application. However, the total amount collected by the company and that calculated with the average rate 
for the sector (Expression (4)) cannot be considered especially significant, and we believe that it would not 
alter the results and conclusions of the study substantially. To give an idea of the magnitude of this deviation, 
in 1989 the smallest deviation in absolute terms was 0.02%, while the company that incurred the largest devi­
ation did so with 2.0%; for its part, in the last year that the MLE was in force, 1997, the interval was between 
0.11% and 2.4%. 
20. The decomposition of Expression (10) is based on the technology of the period t +1, as reflected in Figures 1 and 
2. It is possible to accomplish an alternative decomposition to (10) using the technology of period t. This opens up 
the possibility of decomposing the activity effect using the arithmetical mean of the two decompositions. 
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21.	 The HV deserves a separate mention where, as we have seen in the Section 2.1, the standard costs recognized 
are based mainly on physical units such as, for example, transformation capacity. However, the amount col­
lected by the distributing company from its customers is based on the electricity consumed. 
22.	 These programs were developed by Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell (1985). 
23.	 In addition, due to outsourcing by the electricity companies, there is a tendency to not consider the work 
factor as an isolated input. This means defining the costs associated with maintenance and the work factor 
as input. Due to vertical integration, this quantity had to be allocated between generation and distribution 
for each of the electricity companies, an allocation that seemed to us to be arbitrary. Moreover, this would 
have meant defining an input in monetary terms whereas the other outputs and inputs are defined by phys­
ical quantities. 
24.	 The structural costs have not been included because they only appear in the series from 1993 onwards. 
25.	 Although we used the information regarding transformation capacity in an aggregate way, we appreciate that 
a part of it corresponds to the transformation of electricity from high to high voltage and high to medium volt­
age, and that which corresponds to the transformation of medium to low voltage. The first of these, performed 
at substations, represents a percentage greater than 70% of the installed transformation capacity, whereas the 
remaining 30% is attributed to the transformation of medium to low voltage, performed in what are know as 
transformation centers (TCs). 
26.	 This took place after the exchange of assets between Endesa and Iberdrola. In mid 1994, the merger was ap­
proved between Iberdrola and Hecsa, a company in which Iberdrola had a 96% holding. However, prior to this, 
in March, HECSA-I was created, to which the assets and liabilities pertaining to HECSA’s distribution activ­
ity were transferred. HECSA-I was integrated into Enher and thus went on to form a part of the Endesa group. 
In this way Enher (Endesa) ended up with 55% of Hecsa and Iberdrola with 45%. 
27.	 This is not the case in the situation of medium and low voltage facilities. An attempt was made to modify this 
situation with the reform carried out in 1993, which provided incentives for investments in medium and low 
voltage. It is unlikely that there was any kind of inefficiency in this type of facility, since the legislation did not 
provide incentives for there to be any, as it paid them for their effective use and not for their mere existence. 
28.	 The fact that companies made good use of the weaknesses of the regulating system to increase their revenues 
by means of over-investment is not a new result in literature. Averch and Johnson’s model (1962) predicts this 
behavior. In fact, when a company is regulated by the rate of return method, its revenues depend exclusively 
on the level of investment, regardless of its use. As we have seen, this was one of the characteristics of the reg­
ulation in high voltage in the case of the MLE. 
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Resumen 
El Marco Legal Estable nos proporciona una rara oportunidad para estudiar un sistema de retribuciones multipro­
ducto aplicado a la distribución de electricidad en España durante un dilatado periodo de tiempo: 1988 – 1997. Para 
ello, se propone una estructura de análisis basada en un indicador del tipo Bennet (1920) que nos permite identifi­
car las variaciones en los ingresos asociados a la actividad de distribución eléctrica, para cada una de las empresas 
y cada uno de los productos. La Ley reconocía, regulaba y retribuía de forma diferente a cuatro productos. Este in­
dicador es descompuesto en un efecto cantidad y un efecto retribución. El efecto cantidad valora el impacto sobre 
los ingresos de las variaciones en la demanda de cada uno de los productos, y el efecto retribución las modificacio­
nes en los ingresos debidas a los cambios en la remuneración por producto, que están basados en costes estándares. 
Utilizando la moderna teoría de la producción se explica el indicador de cantidad mediante un efecto productividad 
y actividad. Finalmente, el indicador de productividad es descompuesto en eficiencia operativa, asignativa y cam­
bio técnico. Para ello se define una tecnología del tipo secuencial cuya información empieza en el año 1952. Para 
resolver la descomposición económica propuesta son empleadas técnicas de programación matemática. 
Palabras claves: distribución eléctrica, Marco Legal Estable, ingresos, indicador Bennet. 
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